

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

MEMO TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: Timothy Hunt and Dave Kupferer, Pantex Site Representatives
DATE: 1 September 2006
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Weekly Report

Multi-unit Operations: In response to a recent NA-12 determination that analyses and controls previously developed to support multi-unit nuclear explosive operations meet the intent of applicable nuclear explosive safety standards, PXSO directed BWXT to develop a schedule for producing the safety analysis changes needed to facilitate side-wide approval of multi-unit nuclear operations. More specifically, PXSO directed BWXT to revise approved Hazard Analysis Reports (HAR) in such a way that the new hazard and accident analyses that evaluate MUO weapon configurations do not introduce new consequences. PXSO's proposed analysis strategy appears to be in response to recently issued classification guidance. Regardless, if the HAR revisions fail to include an evaluation of the potential consequences of some MUO accident scenarios, an exemption to the requirements of DOE Standard 3009, *Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses*, or 10 CFR 830, *Nuclear Safety Management*, may be required.

Occurrence Reports (ORPS): BWXT recently completed a self-assessment that concluded ORPS readability is in need of improvements to make them easier to understand and use. Thirty-four percent (39 of 113) of ORPS reviewed did not stand-alone and an independent reader would have difficulty understanding the events being described and the significance or lack thereof. DOE Manual 231.1-2, *Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information*, requires that reports be readable and understandable by all levels of those reading the reports. BWXT also found that the time to complete ORPS-generated corrective actions was excessive at an average of 72 days. BWXT is implementing corrective actions to minimize this delay.

Triennial Training Assessment: This week, NNSA completed a triennial assessment that evaluated the compliance of BWXT's training and qualification program to the requirements of DOE Order 5480.20A, *Personnel Selection, Qualification, and Training Requirements for DOE Nuclear Facilities*. The assessment team identified four findings, two weaknesses, five opportunities for improvement, and three strengths. The findings included BWXT re-categorizing positions from 5480.20 applicable to non-5480.20 applicable without PXSO approval and mis-categorization of some BWXT positions as being excluded from the requirements of 5480.20 (mostly upper management). It appears that BWXT will be able to readily address the findings. The assessment team also noted that there have been significant improvements in BWXT's training and qualification program during the past three years.

W76 Process Anomalies: This week, prior to separating the main charge high explosive from a W76 pit, production technicians observed a couple high explosive anomalies and stopped operations. The appropriate personnel responded to the incident. BWXT has completed a revision to the W76 HAR that evaluates high explosive anomalies and submitted the revision to PXSO, however, the revision is not yet approved. Prior to submitting the HAR revision, BWXT installed padding on the W76 work stand that will be credited once the revision is approved.

While attempting to separate two structural components of a subassembly, the production technicians (PTs) discovered that partitioning was taking place in an unexpected, and potentially hazardous, location. The PTs took appropriate action and halted work before the situation progressed too far. Initial indications are that the midcase disassembly fixture may need to be modified or the operating procedure revised to avoid future recurrences.